

Temporal Safety and Capability Revocation

“Temporal safety” is a broad term. Two major facets:

- ▶ “use after free”: continued loads and stores to region of memory declared dead.
- ▶ “use after reallocation”: reference to former object at some location used to access a different object at the same place.

Of the two, “after reallocation” substantially worse.

(Anyone want to claim to have never written either of these?)

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Use after reallocation avoidable if allocator. . .

- ▶ *waits* for references to go away
 - ▶ Memory in *quarantine*.
 - ▶ Like garbage collector.
 - ▶ Possibly large space overheads while waiting
- ▶ *revokes* references
 - ▶ Indirection? Lookasides?

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Thinking about CHERI, we. . .

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- ▶ do not have indirecting capabilities.

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So, could build a less conservative GC atop CHERI:

- ▶ Precisely identify referenced objects
- ▶ Still conservatively assume that all references might be used

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- ▶ But we are impatient and don't want to wait unboundedly long for some stale reference to go away.
- ▶ Because we can find pointers, we can also *clear* them!
“Sweeping revocation” (contrast “indirecting”)

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“Sweeping revocation” (contrast “indirecting”)
- ▶ Need a privileged bit of software. . .
. . . can see all memory and registers.
For us, that means the (CheriBSD) kernel.

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- ▶ `mmap` “returns two things”:
 - ▶ Capability to the pages you asked for
 - ▶ A mutable bitmask for expressing revocation requests.
1 bit = 16 bytes of memory in returned pages
- ▶ Before reusing memory
 - ▶ Set bits corresponding to object
 - ▶ Call kernel to do sweep
 - ▶ Clear bits corresponding to object
 - ▶ (Clear the object itself, too?)

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 - ▶ Page table dirty bits can guide us.
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- ▶ Pause times?
 - ▶ Revoke concurrently with application!
 - ▶ Take guidance from concurrent garbage collectors.
(Card marking, trap-and-mark)